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Accountability for the crimes of totalitarian communist regimes became an issue for the 
Council of Europe after the velvet revolutions in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. As numerous archives were released, it became clear that there were no 
essential differences between Communism and Nazism, as both used similar, criminally 
inhumane means to maintain power. Twenty million deaths resulted from political re-
pression in the Soviet Union, and 1 million in the Communist states of Eastern Europe 
(Courtois 4). After new states with totalitarian communist pasts joined the Council of 
Europe, Resolution 1096 was adopted in 1996, containing measures to dismantle the 
heritage of former communist totalitarian systems. Ten years later, in 2006, the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) passed Resolution 1481, on the 
need for international condemnation of the crimes of totalitarian communist regimes, 
which for the first time strongly condemned the crimes that they themselves had com-
mitted. Although most Central and East European states have distanced themselves from 
their former communist regimes and have condemned the grave human rights violations 
committed by them, in Ukraine the Communist Party continues to be legal and active; 
that party has not clearly dissociated itself from the crimes committed by the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union and the subsidiary Communist Party of the Ukrainian Soviet 
Socialist Republic, and it has failed to condemn them without ambiguity. The aim of 
this chapter is to examine the Council of Europe's resolutions and the former communist 
European states' practices in regard to accountability for communist rights abuses, as 
well as to analyze how Ukraine is coping with its totalitarian communist past. 
The Council of Europe's Condemnation of Totalitarian 
Communist Regimes 
The position of the Council of Europe regarding totalitarian communist regimes 
changed: from recommendations to dismantle their heritage to condemnation of their 
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crimes. In its Resolution 1096 (1996),1 PACE was rather cautious as it concentrated 
only upon the goals of the transition process, namely, creating pluralist democracies, 
based on the rule of law and respect for human rights and diversity. The resolution 
stressed that the cause of justice should be served in dismantling the heritage of former 
communist totalitarian systems; otherwise, a democratic state would be no better than 
the totalitarian regime that it replaced. While the guilty should be prosecuted, they 
should first be given the right to due process and the right to be heard. The resolution 
formulated the basic principles of demilitarization, decentralization, demonopoliza-
tion, and debureaucratization in restructuring the old legal and institutional systems. 
An equally important aspect of this process is the transformation of mentalities, as 
suggested in the resolution, with the main goals of eliminating fear of responsibility, 
disrespect for diversity, extreme nationalism, intolerance, racism, and xenophobia. 
In the resolution, PACE welcomed the opening of secret service files for public ex-
amination in some former communist totalitarian countries,2 and stressed that lustration, 
introduced in several states to exclude persons from exercising governmental power, can 
be compatible with a democratic state under the rule of law if these persons cannot be 
trusted to exercise power in compliance with democratic principles: "The aim of lustration 
is not to punish people presumed guilty—this is the task of prosecutors using criminal 
law—but to protect the newly emerged democracy." Furthermore, PACE recommended 
that employees discharged from their positions on the basis of lustration laws should not, 
in principle, lose their previously accrued financial rights. In exceptional cases, where 
the ruling elite of the former regime awarded itself pension rights higher than those of 
the ordinary population, these should be reduced to the ordinary level. 
Calling on the countries concerned to comply with the suggested principles, this 
resolution was silent on the crimes of the totalitarian communist regimes themselves. 
Ten years later, it turned out that the fall of the totalitarian communist regimes in 
Central and Eastern Europe had not been followed in every case by an international 
investigation of the crimes committed by those regimes. Moreover, the authors of 
these crimes have not been brought to trial by the international community, as was the 
case with the crimes of Nazism. As a result of a report on "The Need for International 
Condemnation of the Crimes of Totalitarian Communist Regimes," authored by Goran 
Lindblad, a member of the Swedish parliamentary delegation to the Council of Europe, 
PACE passed Resolution 1481 on January 27, 2006, that for the first time strongly 
condemned the crimes committed by totalitarian communist regimes.3 
The resolution enumerated massive violations of human rights committed by 
totalitarian communist regimes, which have included individual and collective as-
sassinations and executions, deaths in concentration camps, starvation, deportations, 
torture, slave labor, and other forms of mass physical terror, persecution on ethnic 
and religious grounds, violation of freedom of conscience, thought, and expression, 
of freedom of the press, and also a lack of political pluralism. PACE expressed its 
certainty that public awareness of crimes committed by totalitarian communist regimes 
is one of the preconditions for avoiding similar crimes in the future. 
The resolution particularly emphasized its practical significance because "totalitarian 
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communist regimes are still active in some countries of the world and crimes continue to 
be committed." Furthermore, PACE called on all Communist or post-Communist parties 
in its member states that had not yet done so to reassess the history of communism and 
their own past, to clearly distance themselves from the crimes committed by totalitarian 
communist regimes, and to condemn them without ambiguity. 
Although the resolution was adopted, a feeling of a lack of accomplishment remains. 
A collection of articles written by respected analysts and historians, Le livre noir du 
communisme, counts between 85 million and 100 million victims of communist re-
- gimes in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China, and Cambodia, and these deaths, 
as Stephane Courtois argues in the introduction to the book, deserve the appellation 
"crimes against humanity"—the term most closely associated with Nazi-lead genocide 
(Courtois 4-10). Yet, "while it is impossible to imagine any political party with the 
word 'Nazi' in its name operating successfully anywhere in Europe, communist and 
former communist parties continue to exist and thrive" (Applebaum). Certainly, in 
order to condemn the crimes of totalitarian communist regimes, it would be logical 
to treat them like Nazi crimes: to organize a Nuremberg-style tribunal for the crimes 
of totalitarian communist regimes. 
European States' Stand on Accountability for Human Rights Abuses 
by Former Communist Regimes 
The post-Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe have undertaken differ-
ent approaches to the issue of coping with past human rights abuses, although they 
are all facing similar legacies of the past. In his study Third Wave (1991), Samuel 
Huntington argues that the process of democratization may be seen in terms of the 
interplay between governing and opposition groups along a continuum that produces 
three types of transition: transformation, when the elites took the initiative to bring 
about democracy; replacement, when the initiative rested with the opposition; and 
transplacement, when democratization came about through joint action on the part 
of both government and opposition (Kritz 1995a, 542). According to Huntington, 
Hungary and Bulgaria were transformations, Poland and Czechoslovakia transplace-
ments, and East Germany was a case of replacement. 
Czechoslovakia 
In 1991, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) adopted the Screening 
("Lustration") Law, which banned members of the National Security Corps, residents, 
agents, collaborators of State Security, and party officials (Article 2) from exercising 
functions in the state administration, in the Czechoslovak Army, and other functions, 
a s specified in Article 1 of the law, for a period of five years until January 30, 1996. 
Later, Parliament extended the law to the year 2000, overriding a veto by President 
Vaclav Havel. This law may have affected 300,000 people (Benda 42). After a com-
plaint from the Trade Union Association of Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia, and the 
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Czech and Slovak Confederation of Trade Unions, however, the International Labor 
Organization, taking into account the conclusions made in the report of the com-
mittee, invited the government of the CSFR to refer the matter to the Constitutional 
Court of the CSFR for a ruling on Act No. 451/1991 ("Lustration Law"), with due 
consideration for the provisions of Convention No. 111 Regarding Protection against 
Discrimination on the Basis of Political Opinion. Subsequently, in November 1992, 
the Constitutional Court of the CSFR found the provisions of several articles of the 
Screening Law to be noncompliant with the Bill of Basic Rights and Freedoms. Thus, 
the Constitutional Court declared them illegal in that the law targeted "potential can-
didates for collaboration" (Kritz 1995b, 346). 
After Czechoslovakia's split into two countries, the Czech Republic continued lustra-
tion proceedings under the same law that existed in Czechoslovakia. By August 1993, 
210,000 people had been screened, and some of them were banned from the exercise 
of functions in the state's administration, in the Czech Army, in the Office of the Presi-
dent of the Czech Republic, and in some other offices (Kritz 1995a, 534). As L. Huyse 
states, however, it is extremely difficult to judge the real impact of the Czechoslovakian 
Screening Act, as it lasted only one year in its original form (Huyse 68). 
In 1993, the Act on the Illegality of the Communist Regime and Resistance to It 
was adopted in the Czech Republic, which declared the regime that was based on 
communist ideology and in force from February 25, 1948, to November 17, 1989, to 
be criminal, illegal, and contemptible (Article 2). The Communist Party of Czecho-
slovakia was considered to be a criminal and contemptible organization. In response 
to a petition from a group of deputies from the Parliament of the Czech Republic 
requesting nullification of that act, the Constitutional Court confirmed the illegal na-
ture of the political regime from 1948 to 1989 (Kritz 1995b, 369-374). According to 
Jan Obrman, the law on the illegality of the Communist Party could serve as a legal 
basis for the party's liquidation in the future, similar to the legislation outlawing both 
the National Socialist German Workers' Party and the propagation of Nazi ideology 
in Germany (Kritz 1995a, 590). This consequence of the aforementioned law, in ad-
dition to providing moral satisfaction for the victims, seems to be its main outcome. 
The importance of that law was stressed by President Havel: "[T]hrough this law, the 
freely elected parliament is telling all victims of communism that society values them 
and that they deserve respect" (Kritz 1995a, 592). 
In Slovakia, the new government opposed the Lustration Law and, in January 
1994, petitioned the Constitutional Court to overturn it. Though the Court rejected 
the petition, the law was not invoked before expiring at the end of 1996 (Ellis 183). In 
February 1996, the Slovak National Council adopted a new law declaring the former 
Communist regime "immoral" and "illegal." 
Hungary 
Hungary was the first of the former communist countries to adopt a law that would result 
in criminal proceedings against former communist officials. It was the November 4, 
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1991, Law Concerning the Prosecutability of Offenses Committed Between December 
21, 1944, and May 2,1990, introduced by two deputies of the Hungarian-Democratic 
Forum, Peter Takacs and Zsolt Zetenyi. The bill called for the suspension of the stat-
ute of limitations for cases of treason, premeditated murder, and aggravated assault 
leading to death that had been committed between December 21, 1944, and May 2, 
1990, as prosecutions of crimes in that time frame had not been possible previously 
for political reasons (Kritz 1995a, 648). 
Arguments in favor of the law concerned the fact that the victims of the crimes 
committed by the communists were still living alongside torturers and murderers, 
which distorted the concept of right and wrong (Kritz 1995a, 650). The trials were not 
aimed against average citizens who might have become communist party members in 
order to obtain or to keep their jobs, but against those who were involved in torturing 
or killing innocent individuals. Yet the Constitutional Court unanimously overturned 
the law because it lifted the statute of limitations on cases involving treason, and the 
definition of treason had changed several times during the previous decade. The Court 
justified its decision by adhering to the principles of the rule of law: "Legal certainty 
based on objective and formal principles takes precedence over justice which is par-
tial and subjective at all times" (Kritz 1995b, 629). This decision of the Court was 
viewed variously. Teitel provided important justification for the jurisdictional ruling 
when referring to homicide acts that were subject to the challenged legislation as a 
category of grave criminal offense: crimes against humanity. "Protection of the rule 
of law also implies adherence to fundamental international law norms such as the 
principle of the imprescriptibility of crimes against humanity. The failure to refer to 
any national or international precedents on this question is a glaring omission in the 
Hungarian constitutional court's opinion" (Kritz 1995a, 659). 
Subsequently, in March 1993, the Hungarian Parliament adopted a law on "Pro-
cedures Concerning Certain Crimes Committed During the 1956 Revolution," which 
was based on such international instruments as the 1949 Geneva Conventions Rela-
tive to the Treatment of Civilians in the Time of War and Relative to the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War, and the 1968 New York Convention on the Non-Applicability of 
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. In its preprom-
ulgation review, the Constitutional Court upheld the main part of the law on the basis 
of the interpretation of Article 7 of the Constitution: "The legal system of Hungary 
shall respect the universally accepted rules of international law, and shall ensure, 
furthermore, the accord between the obligations assumed under international and 
domestic law." The act was interpreted as ensuring the enforcement of "universally 
accepted rules of international law" (Kritz 1995a, 662). 
As in other Central European states, a screening law was also adopted in Hungary. 
The Law on the Background Checks to be Conducted on Individuals Holding Certain 
Important Positions (Law No. 23 of March 8, 1994) included even more positions 
subject to verification. According to Edith Oltay, the purging of former agents from 
high-ranking state positions was necessary not only because of moral considerations 
hut also because those occupying such positions were susceptible to blackmail. Thus, 
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it was likely to contribute to Hungary's coming to terms with its past (Kritz 1995a, 
667). The law subjected approximately 12,000 officials to a screening process by at 
least two committees, each consisting of three professional judges, which were to 
complete their work between July 1,1994, and June 30,2000. Information about public 
officials will be accessible to the public thirty years after the panel's ruling, that is, in 
2030 (Kritz 1995a, 664). After the Constitutional Court struck down several provi-
sions of the 1994 law, Parliament enacted a new law in July 1996, which stipulates 
that all persons born before February 14, 1972, must be screened before taking an 
oath before the Parliament or the president. After two screening committees examined 
the records of approximately 600 officials born in April 1977, several deputies came 
under scrutiny for suspicion of past work as secret agents (Ellis 184). 
East Germany 
The decommunization of East Germany, which was different from other Central Eu-
ropean States that dealt with their former regimes' crimes domestically, was enacted 
to a great extent by West German laws and courts. According to the decision of the 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on "Human Rights and Democ-
ratization in Unified Germany," some East Germans found the process unsatisfactory, 
largely because the system failed to prosecute the leaders of the corrupt and immoral 
East German regime (Kritz 1995a, 595). 
One of the primary goals of the decommunization process in East Germany was 
the historical, political, and juridical reappraisal of the activities of the State Secu-
rity Service (Stasi). On November 15, 1991, the united German Parliament adopted 
a law permitting citizens to see their files, and a month later, on December 20, the 
Act Concerning the Records of the State Security Service of the Former German 
Democratic Republic ("Stasi Records Act") was approved. On January 2, 1992, the 
files were opened and anyone could obtain the contents of his Stasi file. These checks 
have resulted in the dismissal of thousands of judges, police officers, schoolteachers, 
and other public employees in eastern Germany who were once informers for the 
Stasi. However, according to Thomas R. Ronchon, it was hard to find a legal basis 
for prosecuting Stasi activities. Unlike the genocidal policies of the Nazi regime, the 
act of telling the secret police about the activities of a friend, a neighbor, or a col-
league could not be declared a violation of international law. West German law made 
it punishable for East German agents to spy on West or East German citizens, but the 
five-year West German statute of limitations rendered prosecution under those terms 
nearly impossible. As a consequence, the government had to prosecute officials of 
the former regime for transgressions of East German law, rather than questioning the 
morality of those laws (Ronchon 32-35). 
The moral consequences of opening the Stasi files were quite unpredictable. As 
pointed out in the report by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
on "Human Rights and Democratization in Unified Germany," "[f]rom well-respected 
dissident Vera Wollenberger, who learned with horror that her own husband had be-
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trayed her, to Gerhard Riege, a member of the Bonn parliament who hanged himself 
after it was reported that he had been a Stasi informer, countless lives have been 
profoundly affected." Yet, who counted the number of lives affected by the activity 
of Stasi informers? Moreover, as Joachim Gauck pointed out, "[j]ust imagine what 
would have happened if the files had been kept secret: not only would it have been 
impossible to create a climate of trust, but the files could have been used to threaten 
and blackmail people" (Kritz 1995a, 609). 
There were efforts in Germany to prosecute former president Erich Honecker and 
five other high-ranking Communist Party officials. The charges were based on three 
arguments: (1) that Honecker had exceeded his power under East German law; (2) that 
he broke international law including the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights; and (3) that he violated basic human rights. By January 1993, however, a 
terminally ill Honecker was released from trial, and the Berlin Constitutional Court 
lifted the arrest order. 
Albania 
In Albania, the 1992 Law on Political Parties prohibited the creation of "any party or 
organization with an anti-national, chauvinistic, racist, totalitarian, Fascist, Stalinist, 
'Enverist' or Communist, or Marxist-Leninist character, or any political party with an 
ethnic or religious basis" (Kritz 1995a, 723-727). The government brought charges 
against more than seventy former Communist officials between 1992 and 1994 (U.S. 
Department of State, 822). In December 1993, ten senior officials were fined the 
equivalent of $60,000 each, and sentenced to prison. The very important Law on 
Genocide and Crimes against Humanity Committed during the Communist Regime 
for Political, Ideological, and Religious Motives ("Genocide Law") was adopted in 
1995, prohibiting persons with ties to the regime prior to March 1991 from holding 
selected positions in the government, Parliament, judiciary, or mass media until the year 
2002. In January 1996, Albania's Constitutional Court upheld most provisions of the 
Genocide Law, as well as of the 1995 Law on the Verification of the Moral Character 
of Officials and Other Persons Connected with the Defense of the Democratic State 
("Lustration Law"). As a result of the screening process, 139 candidates were banned 
from participating in the 1996 parliamentary elections. Democracy turned out to be 
very weak in Albania, however, and despite the screening results, the Socialist Party 
was returned to power in the June 1997 elections (Ellis 185-187). 
Bulgaria 
Bulgaria went a different way, and the Union of Democratic Forces regained power in 
the 1997 elections. A law that made mandatory the opening of all files on high govern-
ment officials, and gave them one month to admit their past activities, was adopted 
'n July 1997. It was upheld by the Bulgarian Constitutional Court. But the Court also 
supported the claim of the opposition party's deputies that the law could jeopardize 
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the ability of the president, vice president, and members of the Constitutional Court 
to function, and ruled that the files of individuals in those positions should not be 
opened (Ellis 189). 
During PACE's plenary session before voting on the 2006 Resolution on the "Need 
for International Condemnation of Crimes of Totalitarian Communist Regimes," Mr. 
Ivanov, a parliamentarian representing Bulgaria, announced that 800,000 Bulgarian 
citizens had been forced by the communists to change their names, and some 300,000 
had had to flee Bulgaria. He also stressed that it was essential that the archives of the 
security services in communist countries be opened; otherwise, it would not be pos-
sible to understand the full extent of their crimes.4 
Romania 
In Romania, a nineteen-member commission headed by political researcher Vladimir 
Tismaneanu was created in March 2006 to "undeniably certify the communist crimes 
and restrictions, from the detention camps to the crimes related to abortions." The 
commission reportedly found that between 500,000 and 2 million Romanians were 
killed, imprisoned or placed in labor camps by the communist regime. Presenting a 
report on Communist-era crimes before Parliament, Romania's President Traian Bas-
escu became one of the first East European leaders to formally condemn communism: 
"As the Romanian head of state, I clearly and categorically condemn the communist 
system in Romania, from its beginnings as a dictatorship during 1944-1947 and up 
to its fall, in December 1989."5 
Russia 
With the exception of the Baltic states, where transition started as replacement and 
changed into transplacement, all of the former Soviet Union's republics combined the 
elements of two or more transitions. The leader of the Communist Party of the former 
Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev, and his policy on perestroika (economic reconstruc-
tion) and glasnost (openness), launched this transition, and it was continued by the 
democratic forces of the opposition in almost all of the former Soviet republics after 
the failed coup, which was organized by a group of Communist Party, military, and 
KGB officials. On August 25, 1991, President Boris Yeltsin issued decrees suspend-
ing the activity of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and confiscating 
its assets. Then a decree on November 6, 1991, converted these suspensions into a 
ban on the Communist Party. Receiving a petition from a group of people's deputies, 
the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation examined the constitutionality of 
the aforementioned decrees. After detective-like court hearings that took more than 
a year, the Court announced its decision. According to Robert Sharlet, this decision 
represented a compromise: it gave each side something and served as a mirror reflecting 
the disorderly, conflict-ridden politics of the transition period in Russia (Kritz 1995a, 
749-750). The lawfulness of the ban on the central executive organs of the Communist 
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Party of the Soviet Union/Russian Communist Party was confirmed, but the Party had 
the right to reestablish local branches of the Russian Communist Party. 
Efforts to screen and purge former Communist Party officials and to adopt a lustra-
tion law failed in Russia. Moreover, some laws on state security that were enacted only 
complicated the implementation of lustration. One, the Law on Operative and Detective 
Activity, banned the public exposure of agents of the KGB (Kritz 1995a, 760). Similarly, 
the Law on Federal Security Organs of the Russian Federation protected the covert status of 
persons cooperating with "state security organs" (Art. 17). Such practices, which are quite 
antithetical to lustration, remain unparalleled in other Central and East European States. 
The Baltic States 
In Lithuania, the government issued a Decree Banning KGB Employees and Inform-
ers from Government Positions, and a Law on the Verification of Mandates of Those 
Deputies Accused of Consciously Collaborating with Special Services of Other States 
was adopted. Although these acts were implemented, and although the Temporary Com-
mission of the Supreme Council investigated collaboration with the KGB and other 
secret services in Lithuania, absolute justice was not achieved. Many of the Lithuanian 
KGB files were removed to Russia, and not all of them were returned. Soon, replace-
ment gave way to transplacement, and the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party (LDLP), 
which was a successor to the banned Communist Party, won the parliamentary election 
of October 1992. But Lithuania's ex-president and LDLP leader Algirdas Brazauskas, 
to his credit, did not run for president in 1997, on the basis that Lithuania deserved to 
have a president who had not been a Communist leader in the past. Such good will from 
former Communists, to exercise transitional justice and to come to terms with the past, 
would be the best solution for dealing with the legacy of the past. 
In 1998, a new lustration law was enacted in Lithuania. At talks on the evening of 
July 22,1998, however, Lithuanian Prime Minister Gediminas Vagnorius said that he 
supported President Valdas Adamkus's opinion that the recently passed lustration law 
was "dubious from the point of view of constitution and international law."6 
Latvia adopted the Declaration on Condemnation of the Totalitarian Communist 
Occupation Regime Implemented in Latvia by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
on August 22,1996, and condemned the actions of all those persons who participated 
in committing the crimes under that regime. The Seima of the Republic of Latvia 
charged the Cabinet of Ministers to establish a commission of experts to determine 
the number of victims of the Soviet Union's totalitarian communist regime. Moreover, 
it called on the European Union Parliament to establish an international commission 
for assessing the crimes of the Soviet Union's totalitarian communist regime. 
Georgia and Moldova 
The Georgian Parliament debated a draft law on lustration, envisaging the exclusion 
°f former Communist Party functionaries and KGB agents from civil service, in 
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February 2007. The law was rejected by the ruling party, as the main list of ex-KGB 
agents was in Moscow and was unavailable to the Georgian authorities.7 In Moldova, 
a lustration law failed to pass as well. 
Common Approaches 
Thus, the practices of Central and East European states, although varied in their ap-
proaches to dealing with past human rights abuses, had much in common. Their actions 
confirm an international obligation to apply punishment for grave human rights violations 
by prior regimes, and are often based on such a duty. For example, in the Czech Repub-
lic's Act on the Illegality of the Communist Regime and Resistance to It, the Parliament 
declared the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to be responsible for the system of 
government in that country in the years 1948-1989, being "[a]ware of the obligation 
of the freely elected parliament to come to terms with the Communist regime" (Kritz 
1995b, 367). Most post-Communist European states outlawed their communist parties 
and passed laws that provided for the screening and purging of people who sought public 
office. Although the compatibility of lustration laws with international human rights 
standards may be questioned, the obligation to come to terms with the past requires states 
to punish those guilty of human rights abuses. Because of the actions of the communist 
parties' officials, as well as of the agents and collaborators of the secret services, a great 
number of innocent people became victims of communist regimes. Moreover, lustration 
laws may be justified as necessary in a democratic society in the interest of national 
security and the economic well-being of the country. Former communist officials and 
secret service agents could not be trusted to carry out democratic reforms. 
The Case of Ukraine 
Unfortunately, impunity for grave human rights violations of a prior regime still 
exists in Ukraine, as the issue of justice for crimes committed under the rule of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and its Ukrainian branch has not 
been closed. The Ukrainian government has not been as consistent as, for example, 
the Czech, Hungarian, and Lithuanian leadership. In the case of Ukraine, however, 
particularly valid arguments exist for dealing with the legacy of the past. Some ac-
tions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union/Ukraine constituted genocide and 
crimes against humanity. 
One such action was the great famine (the Holodomor) of 1932-33, which was 
a crime of genocide committed against Ukrainians. It was organized by the CPSU, 
with the intent of eradicating Ukrainians as a national group. As Robert Conquest has 
shown, the Soviet authorities at first denied the existence of the famine, with the help 
of Soviet diplomats and Western journalists who had been deceived or corrupted by 
the Soviet authorities (Conquest 322-323). Internally, the Soviet press simply ignored 
the famine, but occasionally printed a refutation or rejection of some insolent foreign 
slander (ibid., 310). When the famine could no longer be hidden, some foreign govern-
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 131 
inents and politicians took action, as when Congressman Hamilton Fish Jr. submitted 
a resolution (on May 28, 1934) to the United States Congress, registering the facts 
of the famine and recalling the American tradition of "taking cognizance" of such 
invasions of human rights, expressing sympathy and the hope that the Soviet Union 
would change its policies, and in the meantime admit American relief. It was referred 
to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed (House Resolution 39a, 
73rd Congress, 2nd Session). 
In response to the man-made famine of 1932-33 in Ukraine, Ukrainians in Galicia 
(Halychyna) and neighboring territories held widespread acts of protest, which found 
expression in letters from the government of the Ukrainian National (People's) Repub-
lic in exile and various organizations and parties, to the League of Nations, namely, 
to the head of the Council of the League of Nations, Mr. Mowinckel, and the head of 
the Assembly of the League of Nations, Mr. Voter (Mace 34). The League was asked 
to raise the painful question of the famine in Ukraine as "the very existence of a great 
nation is being threatened" (ibid., 36). 
The Ukrainian emigre organizations in the West fought very actively to bring the 
facts to the attention of governments and the public. In Washington, for example, the 
files of the State Department were full of appeals to the U.S. administration to intervene 
in some way. They were always answered with the statement that the absence of any 
American state interest made this impractical (Conquest 311). As the United States at 
this time had no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union (until November 1933), 
and the State Department was under instruction to work to establish such relations, 
the reports of the famine were regarded by the administration as unhelpful. But the 
foreign diplomatic corps located in Moscow was not deceived. The British Embassy, 
for example, reported to London that conditions in the Kuban and in Ukraine were 
"appalling" (British Embassy dispatch, March 5, 1933). Yet, in general, the West 
kept silent, pretending not to notice. As the British writer George Orwell complained, 
"Huge events like the Ukraine famine of 1933, involving the deaths of millions of 
people, have actually escaped the attention of the majority of English russophiles" 
and ideological Sovietophiles. But it was not only a matter of Russophiles, but also of 
a large and influential body of Western thought (Conquest 321). According to Robert 
Conquest, the scandal was not that they justified Soviet actions, but that they refused 
to hear about them, that they were not prepared to face the evidence (ibid.). 
It was not until 1988 that the ninety-ninth Congress of the United States created 
the Commission on the Ukraine Famine, headed by Dr. James E. Mace, to conduct 
a study of the 1932-33 famine in order to: (1) expand the world's knowledge of the 
famine and (2) provide the American public with a better understanding of the Soviet 
system by revealing the Soviet role in Ukraine's famine (Investigation of the Ukraine 
Famine V). In its executive summary, the commission formulated nineteen findings, 
one of which was: "Joseph Stalin and those around him committed genocide against 
Ukrainians in 1932-33" (Investigation of the Ukraine Famine VII). 
There have been some attempts to organize "Nuremberg-style" tribunals for the 
crimes of the CPSU. Among the first steps in preparing for a trial was the creation 
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of an International Commission of inquiry into the 1932-33 Famine in Ukraine. The 
establishment of this commission was a result of the initiative of the World Congress 
of Free Ukrainians, members of which approached a number of jurists and legal 
scholars in different nations, asking them to participate in an inquiry into the famine 
that had taken place in Ukraine during 1932-33. The Commission was formed on 
February 14, 1988, with seven commissioners: Colonel G.I.A.D. Draper, formerly 
a British prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials; Prof. John P. Humphrey of Canada, 
formerly director of the United Nations Division of Human Rights; Prof. G. Levas-
seur of France, formerly a member of the Commission for the Revision of the French 
Penal Code; Prof. R. Levene of Argentina, formerly president of the Court of Appeals; 
Prof. C.T. Oliver, former U.S. assistant secretary of state and U.S. ambassador; Prof. 
J. Sundberg of Sweden, appointed president of the Commission of Inquiry; and Prof. 
J. Verhoeven of Belgium, appointed vice-president. 
The Commission of Inquiry was established as an entirely independent, nongov-
ernmental body. Under the Terms of Reference, adopted on February 14, 1988, the 
commission was to inquire and report upon: 
1. The existence and extent of the famine, 
2. The cause or causes of the famine, 
3. The effect it had on Ukraine and its people, and 
4. Recommendations regarding responsibility for the famine (International 
Commission of Inquiry 1). 
In his opening statement, the counsel for the petitioner (the World Congress of 
Free Ukrainians), Mr. John Sopinka, Q.C., submitted the contention that in 1932-33, 
between 5 million and 10 million Ukrainians were starved to death as a result of a brutal 
enforcement of excessive grain-procurement quotas by the Soviet government. Mr. 
Sopinka asked the commission to find: (1) that the famine was deliberately caused as 
an instrument of state policy; (2) that the famine was an act of genocide; and (3) that 
Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Postyshev, and others were responsible (International 
Commission of Inquiry 2). 
As a result, it was established to the satisfaction of the commission that it is beyond 
doubt that Ukraine was severely affected by the famine in 1932-33, and that the Ukrai-
nian and Soviet authorities were aware of the dire food shortages of the population. 
It was also indisputable that, although they were aware of the dramatic conditions in 
Ukraine, the Soviet authorities refrained from sending any relief until the summer 
of 1933. The commission concluded that the Soviet authorities had adopted various 
legal measures that amplified the disastrous effects of the famine by preventing the 
victims from finding any food at all or from leaving the region. It was confirmed that 
the Soviet authorities at the time had denied the existence of any famine in Ukraine, 
and that, against all evidence to the contrary, they "persisted in their denials for more 
than fifty years, with the exception of Khruschev's private avowal" (International 
Commission of Inquiry 45-48). 
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Although the International Commission of Inquiry into the 1932-33 Famine in 
Ukraine was not a court, still less a criminal court, nonetheless, the commission, by 
its Terms of Reference, formulated recommendations regarding responsibility for the 
famine. During the debates, and particularly in the closing submission by W. Liber, 
Esq. as counsel for the petitioner, an accusation of genocide was made8 (International 
Commission of Inquiry 51). 
In 1983, the government-in-exile of the Sovereign Ukraine (1917-20) presented an 
Accusation Act against the Government of the U.S.S.R. regarding the Great Famine of 
1932/33 to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. The court did not accept 
the petition, on the grounds that Ukraine did not exist then as an independent state. 
Now that Ukraine has achieved independence, the case of the artificially enforced 
great famine or the Holodomor is waiting to be pleaded. 
Among the other crimes of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Soviet Union, 
there were numerous systematic and massive-scale acts of torture during interrogations 
in the 1930s-1960s, and hundreds of thousands of deaths resulting from beatings in 
NKVD, and later KGB, prisons. According to the statistics of the "Chrezvychainyi 
Komitet" [extraordinary committee], in 1918-19, more than 1,000 people were ex-
ecuted without trial every month. At the height of Stalin's terror, more than 40,000 
people were killed per month, and many more disappeared after imprisonment by 
those security agencies (Borets 222). 
As N.M. Switucha asked justifiably, "why is it that Nazi concentration camps are 
regarded as a crime against humanity (which is right!), but Soviet concentration camps, 
that were scattered over the Siberian permafrost and tundras much longer than the 
Nazi camps, have not been universally condemned as a crime against humanity?"9 
Millions of people were placed into forced labor in labor camps and remained in that 
status for many years. 
Persecution on political, national, language, and religious grounds was a crime 
committed on a massive scale by the CPSU. While the Constitution of the Ukrainian 
SSR formally provided for all internationally recognized human rights, there was little 
tolerance for actions and practices incompatible with the Communist Party's ideology 
(Antonovych 110). Consequently, human rights were not observed. For example, the 
Ukrainian Helsinki Group, organized in 1976 to promote the implementation of the 
Helsinki Accords in Ukraine, consisted of thirty-seven members, of whom twenty-five 
were imprisoned, two were exiled, six were banished, and one was incarcerated in a 
psychiatric institution (Verba and Yasen 10). 
Persecution took many forms. One form was the prohibition against the Ukrainian 
Autocephalous Orthodox Church. Whole parishes were repressed, bishops and priests 
were arrested, and churches were destroyed. In 1930, as a result of a political process 
in the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv, 32 bishops and nearly 10,000 priests were killed (Lyz-
anchuk 204). The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church was also suppressed. Greek-Catholic 
Priests, nuns, and bishops were either killed or incarcerated, and the pitiful remnants 
were finally forced to acquiesce to the liquidation of the Brest Church Union, in viola-
tion of canon law, in March 1946. Both the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox and the 
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Ukrainian Greek-Catholic churches continued to exist in secret during the entire Soviet 
period, and were not legalized until after the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the 
period of 1917-39, 8,000 churches were destroyed by Soviet authorities (ibid.). 
The Communist government also tried to destroy the Ukrainian people by forc-
ibly transferring hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians to Siberia or to the Far East. 
Already before and during the 1932-33 famine, thousands of "dekulakized/dekurku-
lized peasants"10 were deported. As stated by Khrushchev as the first secretary of 
the CPSU Central Committee, in his report about the "cult of personality" at the 
1956 CPSU Congress, Stalin intended to deport the whole Ukrainian nation, and 
Ukrainians managed to escape this lot only because there were too many of them, 
and there was no place to exile them (Avtorkhanov 80-81). 
The CPSU may also be accused of the 1986 Chornobyl nuclear disaster, which Phil 
Reeves called "gambling with the planet."11 The Communist Party should carry the 
burden of responsibility for the fact that on April 27, 1986—a full day after the top 
blew off Reactor Unit 4—children were still playing in the streets of Prypiat, a town 
created for the workers of the Chornobyl nuclear power station, and on May 1, 1986, 
millions of adults and children went on a May Day demonstration to greet Communist 
Party authorities who, meanwhile, were the first to evacuate their own children and 
grandchildren to safe zones immediately after the catastrophe. 
It is worth mentioning that in Bulgaria, Grigor Stoitchkov, who was deputy prime 
minister from 1978 until 1989, and Lubomir Shindarov, who was deputy minister of 
public health from 1981 until 1989, were indicted in 1991 for failure to undertake 
necessary measures against the effects of nuclear radiation, which had permeated 
Bulgaria following the Chornobyl accident in 1986. They were convicted, and their 
conviction was upheld on appeal (Gross 97). Nothing of the kind happened in Ukraine, 
although the justification for such trials was much more weighty. 
Therefore, the question remains: why have the crimes of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union and its Ukrainian branch never been condemned universally as crimes 
against humanity? John Jaworsky gave the following reason for this situation: 
After World War II it was (relatively) easy to identify the "winners" and the "losers"; 
after all, the political system responsible for establishing the Nazi concentration 
camp system was defeated. . . . However, the Soviet system was never decisively 
"defeated" in a way which allowed for a decisive "coming to terms" with what 
happened during the Stalinist years. . . . When the Soviet system finally collapsed, 
under the weight of the growing inefficiencies and internal contradictions which 
plagued the ailing Soviet state, you did not have clear-cut victors, with (relatively) 
clean hands, who wanted to prepare a full accounting of the abuses of the past. 
For a variety of reasons the new leaders of the post-Soviet states, and much of the 
post-Soviet public as well, did not want Nuremberg-style trials which would have 
provided such an accounting.12 
As Ukraine has ratified the 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory 
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, and the acts mentioned 
above do constitute crimes against humanity, as they violated elementary principles of 
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humanity, the argument that existing penal provisions defining the applicable statute 
of limitations were in effect at the time that the crimes were committed does not work 
in the case of Ukraine. 
Attempts to Decommunize Ukraine 
There have been several attempts to "decommunize" Ukraine. After the collapse of 
the August 24, 1991, military coup d'etat in Moscow (August 24, 1991), the Com-
munist Party of Ukraine was accused of participation in that coup. The Presidium of 
the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine issued a Decree (Ukaz) on the Temporary 
Suspension of the Activity of the Communist Party of Ukraine (August 26,1991), hav-
ing accused the Communist Party of participation in the coup. The financial assets and 
property of the Communist Party were frozen and taken over by the Verkhovna Rada of 
Ukraine, pending a judicial investigation into their participation in the coup. Another 
decree concerned the property of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union on the territory of Ukraine (August 26, 1991). 
After a petition from a group of people's deputies, the Constitutional Court of 
Ukraine reviewed the aforementioned decrees, and ruled them unconstitutional in its 
December 27, 2001, decision. The Constitutional Court stated that the Communist 
Party of Ukraine, which was registered on July 22, 1991, as a public organization 
("obiednannia hromadian"), was not a successor to the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union and the Communist Party of the Ukrainian SSR. That is why this decision had 
no consequences concerning the property of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
and its structural part that functioned within the territory of Ukraine before July 22, 
1991. That property was turned into state property according to the December 20, 
1991, Law of Ukraine on Turning the Property of the Communist Party of Ukraine 
and CPSU into State Property (Zakon Ukrainy "Pro obernennia maina Kompartii 
Ukrainy ta KPRS na derzhavnu vlasnist'"). 
In general, the Ukrainian successor government to the previous Ukrainian Soviet 
government has never actually denied responsibility for redressing past violations. 
In 1991, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a Law on the Rehabilitation of Victims of Po-
litical Repressions in Ukraine. Imperfect as it may be, the very fact of its enactment 
is important. Notably, in 1997, the Supreme Court of Ukraine issued a book of the 
Ukrainian SSR's normative legal acts on repression, and on the rehabilitation of those 
who were sentenced. This was the first time that these normative acts, departmental 
instructions, and clarifications, which were the legal basis for repression in the Soviet 
state, were presented in total [reabilitatsiia represovanykh]. Many books revealing the 
truth about the Holodomor of 1932-33 and other crimes of communism have appeared 
lately.13 Monuments to the victims of the terrorization and famine have been erected, 
while many statues of Lenin and other leaders of the Communist Party have been 
demolished, and streets named after Communist Party leaders have been renamed in 
many cities and villages. 
After numerous calls by President Yushchenko on the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to 
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declare the Holodomor of 1932-33 an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people, the 
Law on the 1932-33 Holodomor in Ukraine was enacted on November 28,2006.14 It states 
that the 1932-33 Holodomor was genocide against the Ukrainian people. In 2007, Ukraine 
was urging the sixty-first session of the UN General Assembly to recognize the Holodomor 
of 1932-33 in Ukraine as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian nation.15 
Yet the Ukrainian government has neither created a state commission to investigate 
human rights abuses of the past nor demanded accountability from the Communist 
Party or those of its officials who are responsible for crimes against humanity. Efforts 
to use secret police files in order to screen and purge those who were affiliated with the 
former secret service have failed so far in Ukraine. The Ukrainian government has not 
decisively followed the affirmative international legal obligation on states to investigate 
and to bring a prior regime to accountability for its grave human rights violations. 
Conclusion 
The practice of most Central and East European states confirms the existence of a 
duty to investigate and to bring a prior communist regime to accountability for grave 
human rights violations. This state practice demonstrates that criminal prosecution 
of the perpetrators, which has been the main official policy toward collaborators in 
West European countries after World War II, has received very little support in post-
Communist European states. Instead, most post-Communist transitional states that 
follow the Council of Europe's resolutions have used such measures of dealing with 
the past as lustration or disqualification of former party elites, of agents of the secret 
police and of their informers, as well as bans on former communist parties and con-
demnation of communist ideology, which is as evil as fascism. 
The process of lustration was usually criticized by the international community 
and by many domestic forces as a political rather than judicial measure. But lustra-
tion laws have been justified as necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security and the economic well-being of the country, since former Communist 
Party officials and agents of secret services may not be trusted to carry out democratic 
reforms. In particular, PACE Resolution 1096, on measures to dismantle the heritage 
of former communist totalitarian systems, stresses that the aim of lustration is not to 
punish people presumed guilty but to protect the newly emerged democracies. Time 
has proved that the process of lustration has enhanced the growth of democratic insti-
tutions in transitional states. Those post-Soviet states that have introduced lustration 
are now all in the European Union, in contrast to countries like Ukraine, which have 
not finished dealing with their past. 
PACE resolution 1481 (2006), on the need for international condemnation of crimes 
of totalitarian communist regimes, called on all Communist or post-Communist parties 
that have not yet done so to reassess the history of communism in their own past, to 
clearly distance themselves from crimes committed by totalitarian communist regimes, 
and to condemn them without ambiguity. In some post-Communist states, however, 
Communist parties continue to exist and thrive. 
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Ukraine has particularly valid grounds for coping with the legacy of the past, since 
crimes committed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, with the Ukrainian branch 
as a regional affiliate, constitute genocide and crimes against humanity. As Ukraine's case 
illustrates, it is often impossible in transitional periods of political flux to put in place a 
comprehensive domestic process of coping with the past without the international com-
munity's participation. The best results in solving the problems of transitional justice may 
be achieved through joint efforts of domestic and international instruments. 
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